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1INTRODUCTION
Philanthropy has never really lived up to its potential as an instrument forhuman development. We distinguish it nonetheless from other worthwhilepursuits of charitable work or disaster relief because some philanthropy,
particularly as it evolved in its American conception early in the twentieth century,
was supposed to be more than a mechanism to remedy immediate needs. In particular,
philanthropy was expected to go to the source and address the circumstances that
led to the immediate needs.1 Implicitly, therefore, there was always a connection be-
tween the goals of modern philanthropy and human development broadly writ. The
fact that we’re still struggling with the right way to support human development
presents philanthropy both with a challenge and a new opportunity.
I will argue that this connection and its implications spill over into the more spe-
cialized endeavor of development assistance, whether oﬃcial or private. The latter was
intended to set in motion in poor countries a dynamic that would spur their capacity
to sustain their own social and economic advance. Like philanthropy, it was not just
meant to remedy the needs but also to address the circumstances that generated the
needs. It too has not lived up to expectations.
Development assistance emerged as a distinct ﬁeld of oﬃcial activity after
World War II in the competitive context of the cold war. It was seen as the economic
adjunct of the East-West competition for the political hearts and minds of what was
euphemistically then called the third world. That the “Eastern” model of development
failed to deliver to its beneﬁciaries, particularly upon the collapse of its main sponsor
the Soviet Union, was cause for celebration in the West. That the “Western” model has
fared no better is now cause for profound epistemological hand-wringing, deep policy
debates about who’s doing it “wrong,” and all sorts of Monday-morning quarterback-
ing about applications of the various policy models. The fact remains nevertheless
that Latin America2 is no more capable now of sustaining unaided its own social and
economic progress than it was a half-century ago, Africa is clearly worse oﬀ, and Asia
presents a fascinating mixed picture seemingly unrelated to the levels of foreign aid it
1 In 1950, as the Ford Foundation tooled up to become a national (as opposed to a Michigan) institution, a
commissioned report to guide its programs identiﬁed its “areas of action” as activities toward “1. . . the
establishment of a world order of law and justice. 2. . . securing greater allegiance to the basic principles of
freedom and democracy in the solution of the insistent problems of an ever-changing society. 3. . . improving
economic institutions for the better realization of democratic goals. 4. . . enabling individuals more fully to
realize their intellectual, civic, and spiritual potentialities. 5. . . increasing knowledge of factors that inﬂuence
or determine human conduct. (Cited in Richard Magat, The Ford Foundation at Work, Plenum Press 1979,
pp. 18-19.) Clearly, this went far beyond basic charitable work and inspired the other national foundations
that followed in Ford’s path.
2 With the possible exception of Chile, ironically not generally considered a major recipient of development
assistance.
2has received. Yet only recently have the major donors begun to wonder openly whether
something was not fundamentally wrong with the basic assumptions of the “Western”
model of development assistance that created the international ﬁnancial institutions at
Breton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944.3
The model, although evolving over the years through various prescriptive inter-
pretations, was always based on the same diagnosis: underdevelopment, as in poverty,
is an economic disease and requires economic remedies. The initial prescription
focused on the evident deﬁciencies in economic infrastructure in the poor countries
and set out to address them. Into the 1960s, foreign aid centered primarily on large
loans and donations for building physical capital infrastructure to attract and comple-
ment the industrial investment capital that would be the engine of development.4
Subsequently, the programs added a human coordinating and implementing element.
“Human capital formation” became the rallying cry behind the creation of universities,
policy centers, and technology research institutions in all related ﬁelds. Finally, begin-
ning in the 1980s and into the present, the ﬁeld changed with the realization that
all that physical infrastructure and all that talent and knowledge needed mediating
institutions to weave them together.5 In response, foreign-aid agencies began to focus
on building ﬁnancial, legislative, judicial, administrative, and policy implementation
institutions. Interestingly, this also included, for the ﬁrst time, a realization that all of
this institutional nurturing ought not to be entrusted to the government and, beginning
in the early 1990s, a parallel eﬀort to “strengthen civil society” emerged. This newly
gained legitimacy for nongovernmental actors was built into advisory mechanisms at
the UN Development Program, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the
Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and
the World Bank. In what was seen as a pioneering measure at the time, the oﬃcial
Plan of Action of the 1994 Presidential Summit of the Americas, celebrating the re-
instatement of elected governments throughout the region, incorporated into its
agenda the recognition that:
A strong and diverse civil society, organized in various ways and sectors,
including individuals, the private sector, labor, political parties, academics and
other non-governmental actors and organizations, gives depth and durability
to democracy. Similarly, a vigorous democracy requires broad participation in
public issues.6
Subsequently the agenda of the IDB for the April 2001 Summit of the Americas in
Quebec, Canada, stated:
3 See, most dramatically, Joseph Stiglitz’ Globalization and Its Discontents (WW Norton & Co., 2002) and
William Easterly’s The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics
(MIT Press, 2002) and The White Man’s Burden (The Penguin Press HC, 2006).
4 The idea was that foreign investment would ﬂow to take advantage of the infrastructure and the cheap
local labor. See for example: Lloyd G. Reynolds, “Economic Development with Surplus Labor: Some
Complications,” in Oxford Economic Papers (March 1969).
5 The thrust of the decade was well summarized in the World Bank’s Beyond the Washington Consensus:
Institutions Matter, Shahid Javed Burki and Guillermo Perry (Washington DC, 1998).
6 Section I-3.
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3The eﬀorts to modernize the state as well as to strengthen civil society
cannot fully accomplish their democratic goals in the absence of a culture of
citizenry that makes them operational. . . . The challenge of democratic
governance does not only consist of the creation of institutions, but also the
development and fostering in the population of a culture of responsible
citizenry, which feeds both civil society as well as the governmental and
political processes.7
In the 1990s, this three-tiered capital infrastructure—physical, human, and insti-
tutional capital—was tied to complementary national policies of market openness,
government decentralization, and privatization, summarized in what became known
as “the Washington consensus.” Evidence that the model might be working began
to emerge in some countries in Asia and Latin America. However, the collapse of the
“dot-com boom” in the advanced countries at the end of the decade strained inter-
national ﬁnancial markets and drained private investment resources in developing
countries. Thus by century’s end, the development successes of the 1990s began to
crumble. The “Asian Tigers” experienced crises in their ﬁnancial institutions after
revelations of insider abuse that shook even Japan. Meanwhile Latin America’s star
performer, Argentina, had a near meltdown in 2001 as its overextended ﬁnancial house
came crashing down. Its political institutional establishment, sturdy on the surface
but ultimately insubstantial, called on public trust for support of its adjustment policies
and received instead a massive rejection that sent incomes tumbling by one-third
and the value of the national currency down by two-thirds.
Crises of conﬁdence multiplied throughout the hemisphere in the ﬁrst years of
the new century. Governments were forced out of power in Ecuador and Bolivia
while barely maintaining a semblance of constitutional succession. In Peru the govern-
ment tottered under single-digit approval ratings. In Colombia a desperate electoral
mandate gave the government emergency police-state powers to contain a 50-year
insurgency now ﬁnanced by the drug trade. In Venezuela a radically split population
was willing to risk national instability before coming to terms with itself. Central
American and Caribbean countries were traumatized by corruption, street crime, and
ineﬃciency, and even the darlings of Latin American democracy—Mexico and Brazil—
were shaken to their roots by citizens demanding good governance and making their
mistrust in public institutions clearly known.
As elected governments become increasingly incapable of providing their citizens
the basic levels of stability, prosperity, and security, national democracy itself was
judged to be failing. In 2004, surveys showed that 21percent of all Latin Americans
would consider authoritarian national governments as an option, while support for
democracy as the preferred option declined between 1996 and 2004. Interestingly,
as trust in national governments fell precipitously, citizens became more active at local
levels. These activities ranged from presumably spontaneous street confrontations
spurred by the piquetero movement in Argentina, to organized collaboration with local
government in the “participatory budget” movements spreading from Brazil to other
countries.
7Inter-American Development Bank (2001), p. 19.
4Foreign-aid agencies took note. In 2002, the World Bank published a seminal
three-volume study called Voices of the Poor,8 which for the ﬁrst time explicitly recog-
nized that their ultimate clients did not only have needs—they had voices to express
them. Although not immediately reﬂected in the bank’s daily business, the report
implied a needed sea change in the bank’s approach. It would no longer be the job of
experts to assess and diagnose the needs of the poor; they would now be expected
to listen to what the poor had to say. Outside assistance, therefore, would now shift
toward helping the poor coordinate and articulate their voices more eﬀectively so that
they could design and carry out their own initiatives. The role of development assis-
tance would have to change from addressing the needs to becoming the instrument
that enabled people to address their own needs.
It wouldn’t happen easily. Since the 1990s, foreign aid had begun accommodating
ideas emerging from the three policy devolutions noted above: away from centralized
planning and toward the markets; away from national policymaking and toward local
governance; and, away from government and toward nongovernmental “civil society”
actors. The result was the emergence of two related program concepts: community
driven development (CDD) with the World Bank as its main exponent, and asset-based
community development (ABCD) promulgated by USAID. While operationally dis-
tinct, both nonetheless relied on the community and its energy and resources as the
engines of development.
However, both also implicitly assumed that although the community was the
locomotive—the source of energy—it was the job of the planners to lay the tracks.
The challenge they perceived was how to get the community motivated to follow these
tracks to take advantage of the policy opportunities made available by the aid establish-
ment. While they recognized that the communities might beneﬁt from deliberation
and decision-making skills, they saw these more as a way of ﬁne-tuning what aid pro-
grams had basically laid out. Neither one recognized the need to have the communities
see themselves as the architects of the direction they wanted to take themselves, and
neither one saw the aid establishment as a technical resource at the service of commu-
nities rather than as a guide for their enlightenment. A fundamental message went
unheeded: only the communities themselves can determine what; the usefulness of
the experts lies in helping them ﬁgure out how.
Foreign-assistance donors, as well as private foundations, could understand the
need to work the wishes of the community into their procedures, but they could not
alter their institutional mindset enough to put the communities at the helm. While they
recognized the dissonance produced by their cognition that the voices of the governed
were absent from the governance structures they designed, they were yet able to assimi-
late that information into their world view without altering it. They made the commu-
nities their junior partners. They shared some of the power but did not relinquish it.
8 By Deepa Narayan, Washington, D.C. A ﬁrst volume focusing on Tanzania was originally published in 1997.
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5Neither one of them fully incorporated this new role, which would have required
restructuring their mindset and giving the people control.
This essay is a reﬂection on this dilemma. It is about the diﬃculties found by
development assistance institutions—public and private—in incorporating the idea
of investing in civic capacities rather than just funding development projects. It
explores the possibility that this diﬃculty arises not because the idea is too foreign
to what these donors already do, but rather because it is so similar on the surface yet
mandates a fundamental change in mindset and in the power relationship between
donor and grantee.
9 For an introductory presentation, see: R. Daubon and Alfredo Carrasquillo, Capital Social (Puerto Rico:
Editorial TalCual, 2003).
PART I
THE CIVIC MESSAGE
Most human life happens in communities. In many rural communities andin traditional settings life still goes on pretty much along the basic linesestablished in prehistory: a few hundred individuals bound together by
kinship and reciprocal bonds of loyalty. In such communities everyone knows his or
her place and everyone knows the rules of relating. Violations are easily identiﬁed
and eﬀectively dealt with. People in the community therefore trust each other, not
necessarily because they like each other but because they can identify and keep tabs
on each other.
We call “bonding social capital”9 the structure of norms that guide the relationship
of people in such circles and the trust that comes with it. Of course most human
communities have long outstripped the size of the primordial one. Still, we seem to
carry on the capacity to deal in especially close ways only with the same reduced
number of persons, regardless of the size of the community we actually live in. These
are the people we would call on for advice or for opinions about important issues. In
the larger communities most of the other people we deal with are, in this intimate
sense, strangers.
To deal eﬀectively with such strangers, we rely on a wholly diﬀerent set of norms.
We call some of them “bridging social capital.” They refer to connecting links that may
emerge between circles, with ties of trust that reach out to both sides of the connection.
These links may be a single individual with dual ties or, more likely, two (or more)
individuals who develop bonding ties between themselves, and each oﬀers the other
6trusted access to his circle. Modern “networking” among professionals exempliﬁes
this, as do traditional arranged marriages between families, or migrant networks con-
necting the home community with the host society via emigrants who have adapted
and integrated successfully. Although internally weaker than the bonding ties, these
bridging connections have important economic impact as they allow larger economies
of scale and eﬃciencies of operation.10
But in today’s world a further type of connection is also necessary. These are
indirect links—impersonal, mediating institutions that allow transactions between
individuals totally disconnected from each other. We call these indirect links, and the
norms and practices that regulate them, “access social capital.” They permeate life
in complex societies and allow their day-to-day functioning. They can be extremely
powerful. Advocates of certain public policies can thus support each other by support-
ing a political party that espouses such policies. Savers can lend resources to unknown
investors by channeling them through the banking system. We agree to pay taxes to
a government institution that is far removed from us but whom we trust will put our
resources to good use.
So there is no question that trustworthy institutions are necessary. Development
assistance has focused for the past decade on supplying a perceived need for well-
designed institutions. These have covered the gamut from managing the public
bureaucracy to judicial systems to eﬀective parliamentary processes. Well-designed
systems have been put in place to monitor public procurement procedures and public
appointments, to manage public corporations, and to run public transit systems. In
recent years, assistance has spilled over into strengthening institutions of the private
sector with impacts on public life. Business ethics and corporate social responsibility
have thus received increased support, as have eﬀorts devoted to strengthening civil
society.
Yet in Latin America, bureaucracy remains rife with patronage, judges are nearly
universally suspect, parliaments are often rubber-stamps or are paralyzed, govern-
ment contracts are notoriously awarded to political cronies, government positions are
apportioned to friends, public corporations are seen as nests of ineﬃciency and cor-
ruption, taxes are withheld even by concerned citizens because they do not trust the
government’s use of the money, and few people pay attention to traﬃc laws. Similarly
in the public’s perception of the business sector, cronyism and tax avoidance remain
endemic and unfettered greed is seen as its driving force. Meanwhile, “civil society
organizations” have carved a niche for themselves as an alternative to an ineﬀective
and corrupt state and a rapacious business sector and have positioned themselves
as the unelected and unlegitimized voice of the citizens. The economic costs of this
absence of democratic transparency alone is enough to explain Latin America’s
backwardness.
10 An excellent and common example occurs in traditional communities who export product to metropolitan
areas and rely on relatives in the latter to market their product in their newly developed networks.
7So a supply of good institutions is evidently not enough. To create them by legisla-
tive edict does not make them work. Somehow people must be able to insist on good
governance. But wanting it does not make it happen. Institutions will work when a
public covenant builds around them and demands that they work.11 Creating that
public covenant appears to be at the root of the problem. In my view, the democratic
construction of that civic covenant is what makes it sustainable; it begins at the level
of communities, and only then can it be usefully facilitated by the well-placed civic
investments of philanthropic donors. Like the institutions they are made to serve, these
civic values cannot be imposed. They must emerge organically from the public life
of communities. Civic investors must perforce work enmeshed within the dynamics
of that public life.
That dynamic manifests itself in the political “spaces” where citizens interact.
These may be in the everyday interactions of normal life, or they may be structured
meetings in which citizens gather to talk over shared concerns. We call these public
spaces.12 Although the spaces are most typically local, they may also deal with
broader, national issues.13 Although participatory by nature, these spaces are not
always democratic, however. They may be formulaic and dominated by a convening
authority which guides the proceedings; they may be steered by outside inter-
ventions to arrive at preordained positions; or, they may be taken over from within
by “participatory elites” who contrive to impose their own agendas. In an era when
public participation has become a buzzword for much philanthropy, special care
must be taken by philanthropic interventions to see that the spaces they help to create
and foster remain democratic and open. What then determines the creation of these
covenants and democratizes these public spaces, and how can external donors help
generate the circumstances that produce them? I suggest that they emerge from a
speciﬁc way of relating, a speciﬁc politics in the community. I also suggest that donors
can be instrumental in encouraging that way of relating, although donors would ﬁrst
have to see themselves in a diﬀerent light—as civic investors.
This would change the nature of the typical intervention, and that makes it diﬃcult
for donors to internalize. They would no longer be just funding projects, even though
the funded project might be the vehicle for the investing. They would instead be
intervening in the public life of communities and altering that public life. This will
11 See David W. Brown, When Strangers Cooperate: Using Social Conventions to Govern Selves (New York:
The Free Press, 1995) for examples of the power of these simple covenants.
12 See: A. Bebbington, G. Delemaza, and R. Villar, “El Desarrollo de Base y los Espacios Públicos de
Concertación Local” in Debate Agrario, v. 40/41 (2006) for a theoretical presentation with four thematic
working papers, ﬁve case studies, and recommendations for development agencies. A summarized English
version was prepared for the Inter-American Foundation as “Grassroots Development and Public Spaces
for Local Civic Action in Latin America: Experiences and Recommendations for Development Agencies”
and is available atwww.IAF.gov.
13 The National Issues Forums (NIF) network is predicated on this notion, in which thousands of local
deliberative forums come together to deal with national issues. See: www.NIF.org. A sort of national
public space is convened by NIF once a year around a selected issue with invited national policymakers,
journalists, and pundits and is broadcast on PBS as A Public Voice.
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8require a change not just in the operations but more fundamentally in the institutional
mindset of donors.
We should pause here to note that every intervention into the life of a community
adds disturbing noise. Donors may never notice it, but it is inevitable. The introduc-
tion of a signiﬁcant amount of money, expertise, or other resources alters the political
relationships of the community. Power is redistributed as the immediate recipient
of the donation becomes the oracle that speaks to its source, the donor. The ﬁrst thing
that investors in community development must always realize is that they are inter-
fering with the power relationships of the community. They are not neutral guests.
Typically, funded projects alter this power relationship during the duration of the
project and then leave that altered relationship behind. The ﬁrst premise of philan-
thropy and of development assistance should therefore be to “do no harm.”14
So, three fundamental revisions are required. First, the community must be seen,
not as a frozen picture, but as a dynamic political entity, a coherent system, always in
motion and organized by internal norms of relating. It is neither linear nor static. It
is governed by sometimes subtle power relationships through which priorities are
established and decisions are constantly made and implemented. Any change in those
relationships alters the priorities and subsequently the decisions based upon them.
Second, the interventions of civic donors always represent external noise and
will always generate internal echoes. The simplest charitable intervention will produce
a changed relationship between the immediate managers of the donation and its beneﬁ-
ciaries during the life of the project. This may also leave behind a permanently changed
set of relationships within the community.
And third, donors as civic investors have the responsibility of staying with the
processes they have thus altered and monitoring the damage they may have caused.
Investing takes time. Above all, donors should understand the politics of the commu-
nity in which they are engaged.
The following three stories, selected from published materials, illustrate what may
become of both eﬀective and ineﬀective philanthropic interventions.
New IndianWine in Old Ecuadorian Bottles15
Guamote is a poor municipality in Chimborazo province, Ecuador, with a mostly
rural indigenous population and a nonindigenous minority residing in the only town.
Tensions were commonplace with the Indian population tied to the landowners as
agricultural workers or sharecroppers. Beginning in the 1960s a series of political and
social pressures by national indigenous organizations, the Catholic Church, and vari-
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14 For a further elaboration of this point, see: R. Daubon, “All of the Voices,” in Developing Democracy from the
Grassroots (Washington, DC: Inter-American Foundation and Organization of American States, 2002).
15 See Anthony Bebbington, “Indigenous Communities, Local Development and Public Decision-
Making: The Case of Guamote, Ecuador,” background paper prepared for the study cited in Debate Agrario
(op cit) and available at www.innovacionciudadana.cl/latinoamerica/es pacios.asp.
9ous political parties led to national land reform and the end of the great plantations. It
also led to the formation of stronger indigenous organizations throughout the country
and a series of support services for indigenous groups otherwise supported by the
government, the Catholic Church, and international donors.
Meanwhile, a group of local indigenous leaders began organizing in Guamote to
take advantage of the emerging democracy and the support oﬀered by these programs.
It was evident to them that an indigenous majority could wrest control of the munici-
pality by democratic means and, by 1992, Guamote had elected an indigenous city
council and an indigenous mayor. But the election did more than change the faces of
the elected oﬃcials. In eﬀect, it created a new governance structure built upon tradi-
tional rules of connectedness to power sources once outside the oﬃcial structures
but now formally within the municipal government. Anthony Bebbington narrates:
The model (had) three main components: the Local Development Committee,
the Popular Indigenous Parliament of Guamote and the municipal government
itself. The Local Development Committee is composed of twelve secondary
organizations and is responsible for creating and revising development plans,
implementing these plans and coordinating roundtables among representatives
and the interested parties aﬀected by speciﬁc projects. The Popular Indigenous
Parliament of Guamote is made up of the presidents of each of the 133 rural and
urban communities of the canton. It functions as a space for the representation
of communal interests. The Parliament legislates, delineates policies and monitors
the activities of the Development Committee and the municipality. The munici-
pality coordinates and authorizes all the political activity in the canton. It is the
elected body and the only political entity recognized by the central government.16
Both the development committee and the indigenous parliament became, in eﬀect,
spaces for local civic action. The latter was a deliberative and advisory body, the former
a community planning and executing agency with the capacity to raise resources from
the central government, as well as from private and international donors. Positions in
these participatory bodies were designed to rotate, presumably to decrease the proba-
bility of forming elites or citizen leaders who could monopolize them. However, both
bodies were beholden to the municipal government and although they were both par-
ticipatory neither was, in eﬀect, civic. The parliament had no registration as a formal
entity and the development committee was chaired by the mayor and was structured so
that all its decisions passed through the municipality. The mayor retained considerable
control.
The limited independence of the two bodies protected them both from internal
fragmentation and from being appropriated from without, dangers always present in
a population just beginning to experiment with democracy. On the other hand, it
limited their autonomy and, because the mayor had a monopoly on access to external
resources and international philanthropy, it further closed the only paths to eﬀective
autonomous citizen action. As schools for democracy, as public spaces, both experi-
ments thus fell short.
16 Ibid., p. 20.
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The innovation changed the faces and the structures of government in Guamote
but failed to change its political culture. The bonding relationships of people in
the inner circles were maintained and the traditional spokespersons tended to be
selected to participate in the parliament and the development committee. This further
cemented their traditional roles as it gave them direct access to a hitherto unavailable
municipal authority and to larger resources. This, in turn, further cemented a vertical
decision-making style of authority by municipal oﬃcials and further discouraged
downward accountability by traditional leaders. Says Bebbington: “The population
has never taken everyday ownership of the two spaces created, which has eﬀectively
meant that the civic engagement and action allowed for in these spaces has involved
local leaders far more than the general population.”
Nevertheless the Guamote experiment attracted a great deal of support from exter-
nal donors. It connected horizontally with other communities in Ecuador—indigenous
or otherwise—which saw it as a replicable experiment. Chieﬂy, the experience created
new access social capital with the national government, which used it as a showpiece
of indigenous empowerment, and with an international donor community impressed
by its strong ethnic ﬂavor. But the model became a victim of its own success. Donors
often had competing directives, responding to their own institutional philosophies
and interests, and the ever-increasing lure of external funding kept distorting whatever
internal coherence the local plans may have had initially. Moreover, the weaknesses
inherent in the still vertical nature of its government became evident when the original
indigenous mayor was called for national service and his less charismatic replacements
were incapable of keeping its proceedings transparent.
The lesson for donors is critical and universal. A poor community with authoritar-
ian bonding social connections will rely on authoritarian spokespersons for both its
bridging and its upward access connections. The most direct challenge for donors is
not to succumb to the lure of structural changes that bring such grassroots leaders to
positions of higher authority but to reproduce at the higher levels the same undemoc-
ratic structure. With the admitted beneﬁt of hindsight, donors could have supported,
at the beginning, concrete activities that elicited more direct participation in commu-
nity decision making at the very local levels, particularly with regard to the formulation
of the plans of the development committee. One compromise might have been to retain
the indigenous parliament as an advisory body of traditional notables, to provide a
certain guarantee of stability, and to make of the development committee an arena
where the free-for-all of new democratic ideas was aired.17 In either case, both bodies
should have retained participation in, but independence from, the municipal govern-
ment. Bebbington concludes:
There have been profound changes in the relations of local power, in ethnic
relations, and the exercise of local power. There has been an important change
in the distribution of land. The quality of life and the sense of dignity and
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17An interesting analogue could be the community development corporations (CDCs) common in the
United States.
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ethnic power have improved. However, the population of Guamote continues
to be very poor. While there has been a democratization of power, the
institutions for participation and deliberation are not yet well consolidated.
Poverty continues to limit the exercise of citizenship, and where citizenship
is weak, clientelism continues to thrive.
Cheese and Social Capital in the Peruvian Andes18
Chuquibamba is a semirural village of about 2,000 inhabitants in the southern
Peruvian highlands some three hours by road from the city of Arequipa. In the late
1980s, a grant to a regional technical assistance provider brought agricultural exten-
sion advisory services on basic agricultural techniques and nutritional instruction for
peasant families to this and other communities. This resulted in producing fodder
for increased milk production for home consumption and artisanal manufacture of
cheese to make use of surplus milk. A local cooperative was the venue for the agricul-
tural instruction and cheese production. The project closed four years later having
reported adequate but unspectacular success in meeting its stated goals.
Fast forward 14 years. A visit by the donor veriﬁed that a unique civil-economic
process had occurred rather autonomously. It appeared that the fodder production
had been eminently successful in increasing the production of milk of a particularly
high fat content, ideal for cheese making. Artisan cheese production had increased
accordingly to the point that peasant families had a surplus to sell. It is hard to tell
how the word found its way to the city, but, by 2006, twenty-one individual micro-
producers had spun oﬀ from the original cooperative and were each selling their own
brands of “Chuquibamba cheese” in the market in Arequipa. Distribution was carried
out via traditional kinship channels, each producer placing a number of cases of
cheese on the provincial bus service to the city, where it was received by a relative and
sold in the local open market. Some of the producers were extending this informal
marketing network and selling their output farther aﬁeld, some in the capital city of
Lima many miles away. A particularly enterprising producer was exporting through
Bolivia to relatives in Brazil for sale there. Demand for the cheese had grown to the
point that producers were experimenting with new varieties and, perhaps most signiﬁ-
cantly, a competing town was making its own cheese and selling it illegitimately as
Chuquibamba cheese.
The donor’s visit, after a decade’s absence, conﬁrmed some important civic
changes. First, the cheese producers, while retaining membership in the agricultural
co-op as the spawning ground of new ideas, had formed a producers’ federation
to deal with their common concerns, thus reshaping their bonding social capital.
Second, there was shared indignation—with no less meaningful pride—that the name
of their cheese was now valuable enough to be usurped by pirates. An immediate
order of business, therefore, was registering the “Cheese from Chuquibamba” with
18Reported in Alipio Montes Urday, “Development of the Dairy Industry in the Peruvian Andes,” in Grassroots
Development Vol. 24.1 (2003).
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Peruvian authorities.19 Moreover, a major issue was whether to market under a collec-
tive trademark—duly registered—or to keep their individual brands. Their decision to
keep their products distinguished by brand but all marketed under the common name,
“Cheese from Chuquibamba,” showed considerable acumen and awareness of the
formal risks and opportunities of markets. It is noteworthy that all this emerged with
only minimal orientation from the original NGO, whose sponsored support for the
group had ended years earlier. This was an essentially spontaneous discovery of the
market emanating from their acting together in the co-op, the seminal public space.
Moreover, the group was now discussing collective distribution via a joint agreement
by the producers association with a transport company.20
And it went on, with an explosion of social connections, horizontally with other
actors in the village and vertically with the state. Aware of their collective reputation,
the group now also considered bringing the market to them, by organizing a cheese
festival complete with a “Cheese Queen” beauty pageant. This led to several insights
that created a new weaving of social capital networks in the village. First, while it was
nestled amidst spectacular mountain beauty, its own physical appearance needed
improvement. An old church and its facing plaza might have been attractive in years
past but was now badly in need of repair. This led to a new working relationship
with the parish priest and with the municipal authority to spruce up the town using
volunteer labor and municipal resources—the latter presumably enhanced as the
mayor reported news of this newly found civic energy to higher provincial authorities.
Meanwhile a drive to enhance amenities for visitors led to conversations with the
handful of local eating establishments about improving their menus. Other conversa-
tions with town residents explored the possibility of government tourism credits to
upgrade bedrooms in their homes to receive tourists. Finally, the producers association
approached national public works authorities for a partnership agreement to upgrade
and pave the access road to the village with government machines and engineers and
community volunteer labor. Most signiﬁcant perhaps, is that all these plans were
being discussed at the dinner table of the wealthiest citizen in town, a breeder of ﬁne
horses, in the presence of the mayor and other civic notables. That a newly expanded
public space had been convened by barely literate peasants who now shared the
venue as citizens of the community would have been beyond imaginable just a decade
earlier. Now, though, it was evidently considered unremarkable. We don’t know yet
whether these new ventures will succeed, but it is indisputable that the sense of
possibilities for these folks has been altered in revolutionary ways.
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19 It is hard to overestimate the signiﬁcance of this leap into access social capital formality for peasants who ten
years earlier were barely participating in the money economy.
20 Again, the notion of formal contracts, among themselves and with an outside commercial enterprise would
have been unthinkable a few years earlier.
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Uncertain Development among the Argentine Guaraní 21
The Guaraní people of Fracrán and Perutí had lived for ages as forest hunters
and gatherers in the northern Argentine province of Misiones and across the mighty
Paraná River in Paraguay. Until relatively recently, they had probably been oblivious
to both countries and essentially disconnected from both of their economies. Eventu-
ally, in the 1970s, settlements and forest clearing encroached on their lives. Thus,
crowded into an ever-shrinking territory, they came to a Jesuit missionary for help.
The 66 families had a simple but revolutionary three-part request: They wanted to
learn to read and write in Guaraní and in Spanish to deal with the settlers; they wanted
land of their own on which to live and work; and they wanted to learn to farm that land.
In short, they wanted to achieve in a brief period of time, the transition from illiterate
nomadic hunter-gatherers to literate sedentary farmers—an evolutionary feat that had
taken hundreds of years in many human societies. In an impressive insight, they
wanted to continue being Guaraní, but they wanted to adapt to modern society, albeit
on their own terms. The missionary conveyed the request to the Catholic Diocese of
Posadas in Misiones, which decided to help them. The Church put them in touch
with the donor community.
A transfer of two parcels of Church property and the provision of agricultural and
educational assistance sponsored by the diocese started the process for an integrated
development initiative and, in 1978, the communities established themselves and
began what was the ﬁrst Guaraní-Spanish bilingual school in Misiones. In 1982, the
Inter-American Foundation approved a grant to the Church-sponsored technical sup-
port entity for assistance to the two now-settled communities. It covered agricultural
training plus installations and water systems for chicken and pork production, which
would be sold to neighboring towns. Other local and international donors followed
suit. With this help the two communities were able to establish their land title, build
permanent houses, learn to farm family and communal plots, hire Guaraní teachers
from neighboring Paraguay, acquire bread ovens and sewing machines, and establish
fruit orchards, carpentry shops, and a cooperative for handicraft production. In 1986,
the villages provided inspiration, materials, and cast extras for the nearby ﬁlming
of the movie The Mission about the Jesuit settlements among the Guaraní in the
sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.
Both communities seemed to thrive and, by the early 1990s, the donor projects
were closed out as having successfully achieved their goals. But in 2005, Patrick
Breslin visited and described a miserably diﬀerent picture:
We stopped ﬁrst in Perutí at two large cement slabs that had (once) provided
space for 600 chickens each, complete with a system piping heat to the birds.
21 See: “Dreams among the Ruins: A New Generation of Guarani Rethinks Development” by Patrick Breslin, in
Grasssroots Development, Vol 26.1 (2005).
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The observations continued at the site of the former pigpen. All that remains are
charred stumps of the shed, a concrete ﬂoor and a few twisted pipes. . . . Farther
into the project’s ruins was the carpentry workshop donated by a European
funder. This shop made the bows and arrows, and even a harp, used in the ﬁlming
of “The Mission.” In its heyday, teachers taught carpentry to Guarani boys, but
the teachers also ran the workshop’s business-buying lumber and selling doors,
windows, beds, tables and chairs on order from the surrounding towns. Now the
building is deserted, saws and drill presses and planers stand rusting, and solid
work benches equipped with vises are covered with dust. On the other side of
the town, an industrial size sawmill is likewise abandoned.22
How a project rated successful by donors could turn into this dismal landscape
is an abject lesson for philanthropy. The immediate causes are clear. Thirteen years
after the project began, the Church hierarchy changed and the project’s advisors were
moved to other projects. Meanwhile the external funding ended and international
donors shifted their attention to more pressing problems, including the explosion of
AIDS in Africa and more interesting democratizing enterprises in Eastern Europe,
Central Asia, and the former Soviet Union. Finally, a ﬁre, in the mid 1990s, destroyed
the pig processing operation in Perutí, while Brazilian competition adversely aﬀected
the chicken sales in supermarkets.
But such adversity and competition must be anticipated and faced by every success-
ful business endeavor. And the termination of external support is an expected, even
desirable outcome of philanthropic interventions. The deeper question was why these
communities were so devastated by these problems and unable to bounce back. It is
perhaps signiﬁcant that the two surviving legacies of the initial project are the ﬁrmly
held land titles and the bilingual schools. The latter in fact made the concept of bilin-
gual Guaraní-Spanish education ﬁrst feasible and then served as a model for the now
more than one dozen similar schools in the province. In both communities the schools,
now staﬀed by locals, are the center of village life, bustling with activity and highly
valued.
Community life continued, nevertheless, after the economic debacle. Some 76
families now live in Perutí and 55 in Fracrán. They survive on subsistence agriculture
by raising animals and by hiring out their labor, largely to nearby plantations. Health
services continue to be provided by public clinics in both localities. There is now also
an Association of Guaraní Communities comprised of the 52 communities in the
province. In it, a new generation of leaders serves their respective communities as well
as the association with clear ideas for the future. Products of the bilingual schools,
they value how far they’ve come and are intent in preserving their ethnic identity and
control over their land. They recognize, nevertheless, that in the initial years, excessive
dependence on the technical teams harmed them. Breslin quotes Perutí’s shaman, or
religious leader: “‘In general, the project worked,’ he said. ‘The two goals, land and
schools, were achieved. We wanted the land to safeguard our language and our culture,
and now we have a sense of security because we are on our own land.’”
22Ibid., pp. 28-29.
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Looking back, this—rather than income generation—should have been the initial
theme of the project and the philanthropic support it received. The zeitgeist of the
1980s, though, overwhelmed what should have been philanthropies’ better sense.
Poverty and underdevelopment were then believed to be economic diseases requiring
economic remedies. But the original request was speciﬁcally for land as a means to
guarantee cultural survival. Clearly production on that land was to be important, but it
is now evident that it was not central to the proponents’ ﬁrst intention. It is signiﬁcant
that the two elements most related to these initial goals, bilingual schools and retaining
title to the land, are what remains. Production, meanwhile, was perhaps seen as a sec-
ondary beneﬁt added by the well-meaning philanthropists and left essentially for the
latter to control. The Guaranís of Perutí and Fracrán never appropriated the produc-
tion activity and did not have the wherewithal to rescue it when it faltered. Their
energies, tested to the limit in what was still an impressive feat of self-directed cultural
evolution, focused on what was most important to them: the schools and the land on
which they lived. Everything else was secondary.
The philanthropies’ errors are clear in retrospect. First, the technical teams they
supported greatly misunderstood the communities’ requests for production assistance,
substituting the prevailing development models of the time for the more modest out-
comes the communities wanted and were prepared to handle. To compound the error,
the support teams literally fell in love with the experience. In their desire to alleviate
the poverty of their subjects they assumed them as their wards. The Guaraní appreci-
ated and tolerated them, but never really bought into what they were doing. Of all
the things that were given to them, they clearly appreciated the land and might perhaps
have been willing to ﬁnd a way to pay for the transfer, which would have been a far
more wholesome arrangement. They came to recognize the schools as a ﬁnancial
obligation of the state but insisted early on that they would be community controlled.
That remains.
Meanwhile the philanthropic intervention preserved the original bonding con-
nections within the communities but introduced noxious bridging social capital
relationships with market actors and inadequate access social capital relationships
with oﬃcialdom, which the communities did not control and were unable to handle.
It also introduced an enormous amount of uncontrollable noise in the politics of the
communities. The process by which social capital evolves organically from a solid
bonding base out towards new bridging connections and up toward new relation-
ships of authority, was badly violated.
Sadly, the worst legacy of the philanthropic mismanagement was the harm done
in leaving the communities with a lingering sense that they had failed. They recognize
that the assistance they received was paternalistic and controlling, but one still senses
their disappointment in themselves. Breslin quotes the cacique, the traditional leader
of Perutí: “It was painful to go back over that experience. Remembering what the
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community had at one time and what has been lost. . . . Our generation has a sense that
we have to start building again, and this time we have to do it ourselves.”
Nonetheless they are now far better prepared to embark on this than they were
in the 1980s. They have a stronger sense of themselves and feel secure in their land.
Regardless of the failure of the economic activities, they have been able to survive,
increase their numbers, and raise a new generation of literate and mindful young
Guaraní. Without foreign philanthropy and without national support programs, they
can now do much on their own.
The association could be the instrument for this progress. It presently protects
the communities’ land claims and acts as the bridge between the communities and
the government for whatever agricultural programs exist. It also helps students attend
high school outside the communities and seeks markets for handicrafts. Still, rather
than plan a grand development scheme the association and the two believe that any
renewed eﬀorts at economic development should start with the individual communi-
ties. Somehow, a mature sense of limiting the communities’ reach to their desires and
capacities emerged from the disappointing past experience. That is ultimately success.
If one judges philanthropic interventions both by the achievement of their im-
mediate stated goals and by the establishment of a self-sustaining capacity to continue
advancing, the Guaraní project poses an ironic contradiction. On the one hand, by the
end of the funded interventions the project was eminently successful in its immediate
objectives: the land had been acquired, the schools had been established, and produc-
tion was going very well. Nevertheless, there was little evidence then of a self-sustaining
capacity in any of these three factors. Fifteen years later, on the other hand, we ﬁnd
that production has fallen disastrously but the communities have latched on ﬁrmly
to the schools and the land as cultural anchors and as the basis of their survival as a
people. One might posit, to the credit of the donors, that because they helped the com-
munities achieve their stated goals the communities are now able to pursue others.
But one might also argue that by enticing them with production goals that they did
not ask for and could not ultimately sustain, philanthropists caused the communities
to lose time and to experience both frustration and a sense of failure. That the donors
could not see this to begin with should induce some soul searching on the part of
philanthropists.
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PART II
INTERVENING IN
THE POLITICS OF
COMMUNITY
Iargued in Part I that there can be no sustained social and economic advancementwithout a politics that gives ordinary people a sense of ownership and controlover their circumstances.23 I suggested that this sense can be furthered by
philanthropic interventions only insofar as the latter are conceived as investments
in the individual and collective capacities for their beneﬁciaries’ self-empowerment
rather than as transferences of money for concrete activities.
The ﬁrst act of self-empowerment is a capacity to deﬁne one’s own problems.
Solutions derived from this deﬁnition—with or without expert assistance—are likelier
to be sustained over a time suﬃcient to carry them through. Externally deﬁned prob-
lems and solutions will always be suspect, and they are likelier to be abandoned as
stumbling blocks inevitably arise.24 Fundamental self-governance is then a sine qua
non for sustained human progress.
Philanthropy for human progress—development philanthropy—should therefore
see as its primary pursuit its beneﬁciaries’ capacities for self-scrutiny and diagnosis,
from the individual to the collective. The United Nations Development Program
deﬁnes it as “a capacity for self-governance—self-determination, self-organization,
self-management— a capacity for inclusive processes of decision making and eﬀective
action and, a capacity, especially, for social learning.”
The reasoning that connects the individual to the collective is straightforward. A
self-assured and growing sense of control over one’s individual circumstances will
eventually impinge on one’s surrounding context, leading the individual to seek some
control over it as well. But as contextual circumstances are always shared with others,
one must relate to them in some way. One can then either try to impress one’s will
on them (an unfortunate but common occurrence) or seek through deliberation with
others a shared or public direction in which mutual as well as competing interests
can be recognized. This public ownership of shared concerns is the foundation of
self-governance. Ideally, philanthropy should facilitate public ownership as the basis
of sustained human progress. But philanthropy seldom serves that purpose.
23 Refer also to Daubon and Tenorio, “Civil Investing, Building Community,” Kettering Review Vol. 24.1 (2006).
24 For a detailed presentation, see also: Daubon and Saunders: “ Operationalizing Social Capital: A Strategy to
Enhance Communities’ Capacity to Concert,” International Studies Perspectives (May 2002).
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Only after a community has identiﬁed its problem and deliberated to choose its
path toward a solution should the philanthropist engage it in the design and execution
of a plan of action. Yet philanthropy too often focuses immediately and exclusively on
the plan of action. At best, it assumes that the deﬁnition of the problem and the path
proposed to address it are in fact what the beneﬁciaries would have deﬁned on their
own after a thoughtful discussion. At worst, philanthropy openly relies on the opinion
of experts or of community elites to deﬁne the problem on behalf of the public. In
either case, those most aﬀected by the problem and by the solution are allowed little
say and therefore no power over them.
Moreover, while philanthropy often excels at promoting individual self-suﬃciency,
it tends to foster in its beneﬁciaries a capacity to adapt to their context as a given rather
than fostering an ability to change that context. Thus poor people are often “empow-
ered” to better survive in a context of public welfare or housing policies, of given
prices for their products or for their labor, or within speciﬁcally deﬁned marketing or
educational opportunities. They are helped to take better advantage of circumstances,
but seldom does philanthropy encourage its beneﬁciaries to try to change them. The
power to change adverse circumstances requires concerted, collective action. Philan-
thropy is seldom comfortable with this civic requirement because it requires a diﬀerent
sort of philanthropy: investing in collective, interactive capacities. It requires weaving
new strands of social capital. Instead, while changing the context for ordinary folks is
often seen as desirable, the actual changing is left to more powerful advocacy forces,
which the newly empowered poor may be encouraged to join as supernumeraries
but seldom as directors. That is seen as a job for experts or social entrepreneurs, who
may emerge from the people, often with philanthropic help, but who end up higher
on the political food chain. That ordinary folks can exercise leadership on a day-to-day
basis through their reshaped collective civic action requires a diﬀerent view of leader-
ship—of “leaderful” communities rather than of social entrepreneurs—and a diﬀerent
philanthropy. Occasional cases in which collections of ordinary individuals eﬀectively
manage to change their contexts by their concerted action are lauded as heroic, but
they are exceptional.
Philanthropists thus seldom encourage their grass roots to recast their relationships
and organize civically in new ways to challenge the limits of their contextual environ-
ment, much less the limitations imposed by their own culture. This is seen as either
risking disillusionment or as disrespectful of their heritage. Yet to continually press
against established limitations, to develop a sense that one can own and change any-
thing, is the only path toward the ownership that nurtures sustainable and democratic
self-suﬃciency. This requires a community to question its relationships. Again, rather
than supporting speciﬁc projects, this requires a philanthropy that invests in civil
capacities; not necessarily to do diﬀerent things, but perhaps to do the same things
very diﬀerently.
The failure of philanthropy to focus its assistance on the ﬁrst two necessary steps—
self-diagnosis and self-direction—has produced lasting and detrimental eﬀects in
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powerless populations everywhere. By so frequently allowing others, such as well-
meaning philanthropists, to diagnose the needs and prescribe the solution for them,
the weakest members of these populations are deprived of their ﬁrst act of empower-
ment. By further disempowering those who are already powerless, philanthropy turns
them into dependent clients. This has the pernicious consequence of cementing
the existing dysfunctional relationships, justifying the need for endless philanthropy,
and assigning its beneﬁciaries the roles of perpetual supplicants.
I do not question the good intentions of philanthropists, but it is a painful reality
that while philanthropy is good at addressing needs, it doesn’t really work to change
the conditions that caused the needs in the ﬁrst place. As a result, few beneﬁciary
communities ever eﬀectively “graduate” into self-suﬃciency. To address this, I pro-
pose a diﬀerent strategic approach to communities, an outreach that works within
a community’s own political process.
ACommunity’s Political Process
Communal life is about the distribution and use of power for making decisions.
We refer not necessarily to the power to coerce, but more broadly to the power to make
things happen,25 even if that power is unrealized or dormant.
Power is used to set priorities for the use of a community’s limited resources and
to choose, design, and implement solutions. The distribution of power may run the
gamut from concentrated and unaccountable to diﬀuse and democratic. Still, certain
steps must invariably occur.26
Step 1: “Something needs attention.” First, someone has to come to this realiza-
tion. This could result from the whim of the local autocrat at one extreme or, at the
other, from the conversation spawned by a concerned citizen who ﬁrst convenes a
few neighbors to share a concern. Who participates in this ﬁrst stage is critical, as it
will determine whose voices, interests, and mindsets will frame the question and
consequently the proposed solution. The more representative the voices, the more
sustainable will be the decisions that will be taken. The ﬁrst concern for a civic investor
who considers responding to a community proposal is to determine whose voices
are represented in it.
It may not be simple. To the extent that the investor does not know the commu-
nity, he or she will have to rely on the opinions of agents, themselves actors in the
power relationships. Moreover, the convening itself may be an extremely complicated
political act. The smaller and more homogenous the group, the simpler it will be to
get agreements. As one approaches 100 percent representation, the addition of the
intransigent fringes present in every society will drive the political “cost” of including
them sharply upward.
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25 See: Harold Saunders, A Public Peace Process; Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conﬂicts
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999) for an elaboration of this notion of power and its implications.
26 For a full description see: Daubon and Saunders, op. cit.
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But there is also a cost to exclusion. Those left out of the conversation will, at best,
have no stake and will expend no eﬀort in acting on its outcomes. They may just go
along to see what, if any, beneﬁt the decision brings them and may try to avoid its
eﬀects if it doesn’t beneﬁt them. At worst, these absentees will consciously try to un-
dercut or even subvert a policy in which they had no input. When decisions are made
by the few, and the excluded are many, the cost of exclusion can be very high, with
reactions that can run the gamut from simple impediments to armed opposition. As
more are brought into the tent, the cost of exclusion decreases.
From a planner’s—and a donor’s—point of view, the sensible place to stop is the
point at which adding another voice to the conversation will add more complexity than
the beneﬁt it brings. . . . A donor would therefore do well to consider in a proposal
whether enough diversity is encompassed in its formulation, and whether adding more
would bring more trouble than it is worth.
Notice also that as the conversation progresses and as the level of comfort increases
in dealing with sensitive issues, the diﬃculty posed by diversity will tend to drop. That
means that more diverse voices could be constructively brought in. Civic investors
should be attentive to the notion that as the process advances it might be possible to
insist on greater diversity than was originally advisable.
Step 2: “What exactly IS the problem?” Even absolute dictators will have a
circle of trusted advisors. Likewise a community decision maker, even when acting
more or less alone, will seek advice from his or her inner circle. The ﬁrst question that
should be addressed is the nature of the problem needing attention. While symptoms
by their urgent nature cry out for attention, underlying causes are often disguised and
harder to diagnose. By the same token, symptoms are easier to treat. Those who must
produce results may thus be likelier to gravitate toward symptoms and immediate
results and away from the thornier problems underneath. Unfortunately, this tendency
often overtakes donors as well. Pressed for results by their own internal forces, they
are often attracted by proposals that deal with symptoms. It is all too easy to fall back
on the notion that being “responsive to the proponents” requires responding to the
proposal as presented and not insisting on a deeper look.
This is destructive to community building and is perhaps the greatest harm done
by donors. It deprives the community of the ﬁrst basic act of empowerment: diagnos-
ing its own problem. Admittedly, it is a legitimate quandary for donors as their sources
of ﬁnancing and their boards of directors press for results. It is far easier and quicker
to build a school with a community than to engage with it in a lengthy process of
discovering why the community has been unable to provide its own school, and then
proceeding with the slow process of discovering how the donor can help the com-
munity ﬁnd its own means to construct the school.
Yet this discovery of a community’s underlying problem is indispensable to
development. George Frederickson argues that such innovation takes the form of
“discovering answers for as yet unasked questions.”27 To urge a community to set
27 H. George Frederickson, Easy Innovation and the Iron Cage (Kettering Foundation, 2003), p. 33.
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immediate goals distorts its priorities and delays its capacity to search within itself
for the underlying weaknesses, which should be the aim of philanthropic interven-
tions. The ﬁrst approach produces results; the second produces self-suﬃciency and
development.
Donors, big and small, have caused the greatest damage to development by thus de-
priving communities of the basic power to determine the nature of their own problems.
The ﬁrst assistance that donors can provide as civic investors is with this process
of “naming” the underlying problem. They should nevertheless be aware that the more
diverse the naming group the harder it will be to arrive at a common name. Persons
with diverse viewpoints and diverse personal circumstances will ascribe diverse causes
to the symptom. Diﬀerences of age, gender, and social condition will tinge the diagno-
sis. Cleavages in the social fabric of the community will come to the fore as diﬀerences
in perception will likely lead to accusations that “they”—the omnipresent others—
are at the root of the problem. In fact, the community’s fabric may be so frayed that
the conversation may not proceed further; it should then detour from the issue-at-hand
and into a diﬀerent conversation to deal with the dysfunction underlying the relation-
ship itself. A Sustained Dialogue should then follow.28
It is quite possible that even a relatively harmonious community with a broadly
representative set of voices at work may not hit upon the underlying problem at the
ﬁrst pass. The process may have begun with a less representative group and made a
ﬁrst diagnosis based on an overly simplistic view of the problem. But as the conversa-
tions progress and as solutions are suggested, more voices may join in the conversation,
and other deﬁnitions of the problem may be found. The donor has the obligation to
support this, process, not by directing it but by accompanying it, asking questions
and making suggestions when approached.
Step 3: “If that is the problem, how can we approach it?”Once a deliberating
group arrives at a consensus on what the problem is, the tensions implicit in the
deﬁning exercises relax and the conversation naturally takes a new direction; but a
new tension will develop. Even if there were complete agreement as to the deﬁnition
of the problem, no conceivable problem will have a single avenue of attack. Instead,
each of diﬀerent possible avenues will have its advantages and its disadvantages, and
the decision-making group will have to weigh or deliberate the costs and beneﬁts.
Complicating matters is the likelihood that perceptions of the “advantages” and
“disadvantages” will vary between the members of the group. What to some may
appear as advantages may even be disadvantages to others.
A disciplined exercise is now required to lay out the possible alternative paths—
a framing of the options. The more options identiﬁed, the richer the subsequent con-
versation, and presumably, the more sustainable the decision based on it. To the extent
that these options are condensed after eﬀective naming into a workable number of
28 See Saunders (op. cit) for a detailed description and examples of Sustained Dialogue in practice.
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alternatives29 and laid out in such a way that tension is evident between them, the
clearer it will be to the participants that they will have to make a diﬃcult choice. To
choose one path and its implicit advantages means giving up the advantages of another.
The richness—and the implicit sustainability of democratic versus authoritarian
decision making—means that more voices will identify more paths. The authoritarian
or the expert will more likely favor the ﬁrst path that strikes their prior or “educated”
preferences. Not only will they lack the purchase of a public that sees its voice in the
decision; they will start out with a more limited set of possible choices. Democracy is
unpredictable and messy; but its decisions are encompassing and that makes them
more sustainable.
Step 4: Making the choice.Well-framed choices will present the participants with
clear alternative paths. The alternative that best meets an expert technician’s criteria
might not take the community where it wants to go. If asked, participants might
be willing to sacriﬁce some technical advantage for another beneﬁt. But such a “non-
technical” choice can only be made by the people themselves. This approach may
not even have been evident beforehand, so it could not have been predicted by a well-
informed and well-intentioned benefactor. Only the deliberative conversation and
the involvement of the people will bring out the important values in the choices.
Such public deliberative conversations have taken many forms. They all aim to take
their participants to three critical discoveries. First is the richness of information about
the issue-at-hand. As more voices come in, each with bits of new information, it typi-
cally becomes clear to participants that much knowledge is to be gained by listening.
Second a participant may begin to discover that another’s preference for a diﬀerent
path is based on his or her particular circumstances rather than on some evil intent.
One may still disagree with another’s choice, but one begins to understand why it was
chosen. That brings the critical third discovery: the other is not wrong; he or she just
sees the problem diﬀerently. But if the other is not wrong, then I am not necessarily
right. This is contrary to the way one normally enters into such conversations; one
typically comes to argue one’s position and to convince others of its righteousness. But
this revelation shatters the preordained sense of certainty. This incipient tolerance for
ambiguity about one’s own preferences opens the path to democratic decision making.
This cannot come from a closed decision process among advocates of one position;
it comes only from the richness of a diverse deliberative public. Hence its solidity once
a decision is reached.
A donor’s constructive role might be to oﬀer space for this deliberation: facilitate
the convening of voices; train or secure a moderator to help the group dig for the
underlying problem; frame the alternative paths; and help guide the conversation
to navigate the space among the choices. There is no correct solution; the diverse
participants will have to discover their own. Whatever they discover and make their
own will be the one they will stand by.
Democracy is
unpredictable
and messy; but
its decisions are
encompassing
and that makes
them more
sustainable.
29 See: Kettering Foundation, “Framing Issues for Public Deliberation.”
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Step 5: Drafting a plan. After deﬁning the underlying problem, choosing an
approach to dealing with it may be the single most empowering act of a free people.
Self-governance is in fact the capacity to decide where the collective wishes to go.
Only the people themselves can decide what they need to do. How to do it becomes
a question of technical support, for which external donors can be very helpful.
Unfortunately, most donor assistance jumps in at this stage and ignores the question
of whether the diagnosed problem and the proposed path to its solution actually have
the purchase of those who will live by it. By denying the intended beneﬁciaries this
act of self-empowerment, they delay the development of self governance. The damage
done over many years by development assistance administrators telling poor people
“what’s wrong with them and what to do about it” has been enormous. It explains,
in large part, why otherwise good policies don’t take hold in poor communities and
countries and why bad governance continues to be the rule.
One can safely assume that most proposals submitted to funding agencies have not
gone through this deliberative screening. So, instead of deciding whether to fund them
on their merits alone, the donors should try to look at the process that generated them.
The donor organization then has a choice. It can set aside the proposal and decide to
fund the process of naming and direction setting, based on the donor’s instinct about
the quality of the proponent rather than on an evaluation of the proposal. Or, perhaps
more acceptable to common funding protocols, it can fund the proposed activity but
encourage a continued deliberative process as it progresses, fully aware that major
mid-course redeﬁnitions and corrections are likely to emerge. Either way, the funding
organization cannot handle the situation with the usual tools at its disposal. It has to
rethink its role.
Step 6: Executing, evaluating, and correcting the plan.No plan will be perfectly
laid out the ﬁrst time around, no matter how thoroughly deliberated it may have been.
Likewise, no community will hit it right on its ﬁrst try. The very dynamics of commu-
nity life, and the inclusion of increasingly diverse voices as the process matures will
almost guarantee that new points of view will be brought to bear on the priorities and
diﬀerent decisions will likely result. No donor should therefore insist on the imple-
mentation of the plan as originally devised, no matter how democratic its inception.
The changing circumstances of community life will present new challenges and oppor-
tunities not envisioned at the ﬁrst pass. In fact, this capacity to continually reassess
and correct the path might be the most precious indicator of development and the
most signiﬁcant accomplishment of the donor’s support.
The outcome of development philanthropy should, therefore, not be the eﬀective
fulﬁllment of a project. The successful outcome of civic investing is a community’s
enhanced capacity to make autonomous decisions in a comprehensive, sustainable
way to confront challenges and take advantage of opportunities that may arise. That
makes for a successful community. And it requires a diﬀerent kind of donor.
Only the people
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ACivil Investing Primer for Development Philanthropy
To become a diﬀerent kind of donor requires both a diﬀerent approach and
a diﬀerent mindset. The approach is perhaps the easiest to adopt and—as it
inevitably brings questions about the reason for funding as we do—will ease the
transition toward a more enlightened learning mindset, the real challenge for
philanthropy. So, here’s a checklist for civil investors approaching a funding
decision.30
• Determine who is and who is not in the conversation that led to the
proposed activity. Encourage as diverse a conversation as the circumstances
will bear. Such a conversation will be diﬃcult and conﬂict-laden, but it will
generate more knowledge and will produce a more solid commitment to the
agreements that are made, no matter how unimportant they may be at ﬁrst.
Those small, committed agreements, few at ﬁrst and later by the thousands
and millions, will form the bedrock of sustainable governance.
• Look for themes and patterns rather than causes and problems. Look for
the simple underlying pattern and the clear organizing principle beneath the
surface complexity. Focus on relationships—economic, social, and political—
and their components: identities, expressions of authority and power, inter-
ests, perceptions and stereotypes, and patterns of interaction of the groups
involved. Let the concrete activity be secondary to the commitment to work-
ing together, and be willing to modify the activity as the capacity of the group
to make decisions progresses.
• Trust the power of the organizing principle once discovered, and let it
loose.Deﬁne some expectation of acceptable behavior and combine it
with the freedom to individuals to assert themselves in unplanned ways.
Anticipate changes; expect and welcome the unexpected.
• Give it time. Simple-minded ideas are designed quickly, even when they
may appear complicated. Lasting ones, even if simple, must emerge at their
own pace. Stay with the process and accompany it even beyond the funding
period.
• Encourage applicants to plan the global, but let the local free. Everywhere
in nature, order is maintained in the midst of change because autonomy exists
at local levels. A community, as any system, can manage the global demands
for change when it has built into it internal freedom of motion at the local
level. The local level shouldn’t be waiting for instructions, but rather should
be constantly innovating, guided by a shared organizing principle of self-
reference. 31
30This checklist is adapted from: R. Daubon, “A Primer for Promoting Deliberative Democracy and the
Dynamics of Development at the Grassroots,” in Journal of Public Deliberation, Vol. 1.1 (2005).
31This argument is exquisitely developed in Robert Nisbet, The Quest for Community (Oxford University
Press, 1990).
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32 Drafted with Ana Tenorio.
33 Refer to www.redeamerica.org.
PART III
A DIFFERENT KIND
OF DONOR32
Can donors learn to do civic investing? Indeed, they can. But undertakingcivic investing requires that they learn to operate with a diﬀerent institutionalmindset and change their commitments—meaning that they will have to
rethink their role in the complex world of development assistance. This transformation
requires tremendous political will, given that institutions are trapped within a system
that provides incentives for a diﬀerent set of short-term results.
Development-assistance institutions are communities of people with their own
characteristic behaviors underpinned by human relationships. Within these communi-
ties, members tend to share characteristic language, attitudes, and rules of interaction
that can facilitate or inhibit the collaborative inquiry that leads to institutional learning.
It is not possible to change institutional mindsets without changing individual routines
and vice versa. It is all connected.
Inquiry does not become organizational if individuals learn and inquire separately
from the organization to which they belong. For example, program oﬃcers continu-
ously learn from the funding activities they administer—even and especially when the
communities that receive those funds struggle through their project’s implementation
and, consequently, may fail to accomplish all of their goals. And, while program oﬃcers
may learn from this kind of situation and use that knowledge when they consider
future funding, they also understand that administering successful projects is a sign
of professional eﬀectiveness and status and that revealing their association to a failed
project could jeopardize their careers. So, program oﬃcers often elect not to share
their learning through a process of organizational inquiry because that process is itself
threatening and could bring embarrassment or professional reprisals.
Donors must promote open forums in which members of the organization can
question, challenge, and propose amendments or improvements to the organizational
commitments. This diversity of opinion enriches the potential for learning but it
also increases the complexity of human relationships. Although diversity of opinion
enriches the potential for learning, staﬀ members must agree on a set of agreed and
explicit principles to guide its inquiry and process of discovery. The 57 members
of RedEAmerica, for example,33 the Inter-American Network of Corporations and
Corporate Foundations went through an intense process of dialogue and deliberation
to agree on key principles for grassroots development. All other institutional develop-
ment processes have subsequently gravitated around those principles.
Donors must
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Learning occurs when those complex relationships themselves promote the sharing
of experiences, the discussion of programs, projects, and budgets. Organizations and
communities move from confrontation—or alternatively, avoidance—to collaboration
when they engage in deliberative dialogue. When an organization acts on the agree-
ments established through dialogue, it assumes a commitment to continue with the
process of inquiry and detection of error. It is through this potent cocktail of collective
experience, learning by doing, and consequent reﬂection that institutions may learn.
As part of their culture, however, institutions usually exhibit defensive routines that
may inhibit the learning process.34 The more an individual or institution is committed
to a particular belief or idea, for example, the more resistant the individual or institu-
tion will be to information that is dissonant to that belief. If rejection is not feasible
because of the unimpeachable legitimacy of the source of the conﬂicting cognition,—
let us say—people and institutions can reduce the dissonance between these two ideas
by assimilating the new piece of information into their original belief system.
Dissonance reducing behavior is ego-defensive behavior; when people or insti-
tutions reduce dissonance they maintain a whole, positive image of themselves and
consequently, do not have to change their modus operandi.35 Human beings and
institutions, however, are capable of behavior that deals more productively with cogni-
tive dissonance. Instead of using irrational defensive routines to assimilate or ultimately
reject new ideas, institutions can promote a safe environment where individuals are
encouraged to challenge existing paradigms.
Mechanisms to Promote Learning
Institutional learning is possible when an organization achieves collective awareness
of the sources of cognitive dissonance, thus opening the possibility for collaboration
and collective action. Organizational learning, then, consists of transforming organiza-
tional dissonance and confrontation into organizational inquiry and deliberative
dialogue.
Individuals usually begin to inquire when there is a mismatch between outcomes
and expectations. Awareness of this mismatch will ignite a cognitive dissonance that,
if dealt with productively, is the engine for institutional learning. If the mismatch is
rationalized, assimilated, or covered up, the institution loses the opportunity to learn.
Finding ways to elicit organizational inquiry to explore those mismatches is essen-
tial to promoting learning. Mechanisms for deliberative dialogues are needed to elicit
this organizational inquiry. In extreme cases of conﬂict, the mechanism of Sustained
Dialogue may be useful.36
34 For an elaboration of defensive routines, read: C. Argyris, Knowledge for Action: A Guide to
Overcoming Barriers to Organizational Change (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1993).
35 Read E. Aronson, The Social Animal (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1980).
36 For more information on Sustained Dialogue, see H. Saunders, A Public Peace Process: Sustained
Dialogues to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conﬂicts (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
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Learning also has an action component and it is important to distinguish between
those individuals who acquire new insights and those who act on new insights. Learn-
ing is productive when individuals take eﬀective action based on their new insights. As
a well-known Chinese proverb states: “I hear and I forget, I see and I remember, I do
and I understand.” After all, we know that we know something when we can produce
what we claim we know.
Learning is about experimentation, which only occurs when individuals do not
feel threatened by the possibility of failure. An organization encourages learning when
it minimizes the risks for experimentation and encourages inquiry. In such a climate,
individuals are more likely to lower their defenses in the interest of the community and
explore new ways of doing things.
HowCan Donor Organizations Best Move Toward Civil Investing?
Philanthropies might wish to consider what intrinsic characteristics would make
them more likely to accept the role of civic investor. The experience of RedEAmerica,
an Inter-American Network of Corporate Foundations,37 might be illuminating. The
members of that network showed a great willingness to put the novel idea of civil in-
vestment in operation; many of them created new programs and some eventually even
altered their entire modus operandi. It may be that in these cases the transition in
mindset was less daunting because they were new donors with not yet fully established
procedures, or because they had previously specialized in other charitable pursuits.
By way of contrast, a number of well-established foundations with ongoing programs
in community development who took part in a series of Civil Investing Seminars
sponsored by the Kettering Foundation38 appeared highly receptive to the idea of
civil investing as a general organizing principle—but evidenced comparatively little
implementation.
This has critical implications for donors already engaged in community develop-
ment. When presented as a subtle adjustment to overall established practice, civil
investing may well generate internal resistance. While “mainstreaming” civil investing
would continue to be the ultimate objective, it may be more eﬀective to introduce it
ﬁrst as a distinct and separate—even “experimental”—eﬀort complementary to a
broader program that continues to serve the same target populations.
The initial presentation might come from peer-to-peer network presentations (as
in both RedEAmerica and the Civil Investing Seminar), prompted by “enlightened”
promoters. The appeal will have to be designed to persuade four groups of actors
in the foundation picture: donors, board members, foundation policymakers, and the
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37 Presently the network encompasses 60 mostly Latin American corporate foundations and giving programs.
See: www.RedEAmerica.org. (Available only in Spanish.)
38 Convened by the Kettering Foundation between 1993 and 2004 at the behest of the Council on
Foundations. See: Scott London, Investing in Public Life (Kettering Foundation and the Pew Partnership
for Civic Change, 2005).
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program staﬀ. Each has a diﬀerent set of motivations, both directly and as they inter-
pret each others’ reactions to the process. Attention must be paid to the dynamics
of their relationships and to where in this dynamic the message is ﬁrst inserted.
Ultimately, the key actors are the members of the program staﬀ who operate at the
level where “the rubber meets the road.” They are in a position to either make or
break the mindset change. The impact of the shift in institutional mindset required for
civil investing is likely to occur not in the kinds of projects a foundation supports but
in the reasons to support them and in the way of evaluating their success. Therefore,
changes must be made in the selection and approval processes and subsequently in
the monitoring and evaluation. Making these changes operational requires profound
alterations in criteria and procedures that the program staﬀ has to incorporate and the
management has to bless.
Operating as a civil investor will imply altering not only the selection and evaluation
procedures, but the fundamental values behind them. The managerial challenge will
be all the greater since the superﬁcial changes will be minimal while the underlying
alterations will be profound. Once highly prized skills and experiences may become
less valued and may result in the realignment of staﬀ relationships. Generational
cleavages may emerge between the “old think” and the “new think” and the eventual
institutional change may have to await a generational one by natural staﬀ attrition.
A further complication occurs down the line with the beneﬁciaries if the philanthro-
pist has an established reputation in its area of action. A philanthropy with a history
of funding youth programs or health-care facilities may face obstacles presenting itself
now as an investor in civic capacities. This may be particularly diﬃcult for applicants
since the philanthropy may continue to support the same kinds of youth or health
activities but for diﬀerent reasons and with the expectation of diﬀerent outcomes. This
requires a very well articulated presentation of the novel reasons why a project was
approved under the new civil investing lens and of the diﬀerent ways in which results
may be judged—that is, with an emphasis on sustainable capacities and not just near-
term tangible results.
Some experience has shown that current beneﬁciaries can readily adjust to the
idea of civil investing if it is explained to them one-on-one rather than in a group
setting. Nevertheless, one of the most challenging aspects has been in advertising the
civil investing purpose in a way that attracts new beneﬁciaries with the right kinds
of proposals. The ultimate outcome of civil investing may not be fully evident until
years after the investing intervention has ended. The challenge still to be resolved is
to identify the signs that a change in civic culture is in the oﬃng as a result of the
philanthropic intervention during the limited time period in which that intervention
takes place.
This still leaves us short in terms of oﬀering deﬁnitive guidance to prospective
civil investors. The need for philanthropy and development assistance remains as
great as ever, yet we know now with some clarity that the “project” approach to
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helping the poor does not produce sustainable results. If anything, it enhances the
sense of dependency that lies at the corrosive core of poverty: the gnawing apprehen-
sion that one is powerless before one’s circumstances. Traditional philanthropies
are not unaware that disempowerment lies at the root of poverty and, as a result,
they have discarded most of their old “Lady Bountiful” pursuits. They aim now to
strengthen the individual capacities of the poor to overcome powerlessness on
their own. This is seen as a better way to address poverty, faithful to the adage of
“teaching a man to ﬁsh instead of feeding him.” It is a complacent sell for philan-
thropies, their donors, and their staﬀs.
It also makes everything worse.
While commendable in principle, the focus on individual capacities delays the
civic context on which success must be based. The challenge of philanthropy is to
move away from the comfortable certainty of investing in individual capacities and
into the uncharted territory of investing in a community’s civic life. This involves
fundamentally diﬀerent approaches. It is their surface similarity that makes it all too
easy for philanthropies to elude the essential distinctions and assume that “we are
already doing it.” They aren’t.
But there have been success stories and lessons to be learned from them. Ironically,
some of these lessons originate in surprising settings, such as the federal government’s
support for community development. Whatever their origin, they all share the view
that the community is the unit of analysis, and the project intervention is seen as a
vehicle for it, rather than an end in itself. They also invariably rely on trust in the com-
munity’s capacity to invent and provide its own solutions.
Ultimately, it is a challenge of the kind of leadership that philanthropies can oﬀer:
one that does not ask to be followed but rather encourages the people to trust them-
selves. In his country’s darkest hour, FDR told his people: “The only limit to our
realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong
and active faith.” Philanthropies could take note.
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